This chapter explores some of the ways youth suicide and suicidality are discursively constructed by young people, academics, and professionals working in the field of youth suicide prevention. It looks to problematize some of the assumptions which underpin current mainstream suicide prevention practices in relation to young people, and to draw attention to the restrictions placed on our understanding of, and responses to, youth suicide through the rather limited (and limiting) discursive resources at our disposal when we try to "speak the truth of youth suicide" using knowledge produced by means of positivist research methods. What we are trying to do is understand how youth suicide is talked about, and what is done in relation to the issue, through a focus on language use and by critically examining the assumptions commonly made about what it is like to be suicidal, what causes suicide, and what are deemed appropriate practices of prevention. In other words, we are interested in the question, what does youth suicide prevention do ?
are not endeavoring to set out a competing theory of suicide (what it truly is, its real causes, and so on), but, instead, we are attempting to speak in another way about suicide, to articulate ideas based on a different set of assumptions, in the hope of instigating new conversations around the subject. We set the stage for our work by beginning with the concept of liminality.
The term "liminality" derives from the Latin limen, meaning threshold. It entered academic discourse in 1909 with the anthropologist Arnold van Gennep using it as a way of signifying the transitional middle phase in any rite of passage between the death of an old social role and rebirth into a new role in society; in such a situation the subject is in a liminal state-no longer belonging to the old world but yet to enter the new (van Gennep, 1960) .
The notion of such a "liminal phase" or "liminal state" was later taken up by another anthropologist, Victor Turner (1967 Turner ( , 1969 , who argued that during "the 'liminal' period, the characteristics of the ritual subject . . . are ambiguous; he [sic] passes through a cultural realm that has few or none of the attributes of the past or coming state" (Turner, 1969, p. 359 ). According to Turner, "the attributes of liminality or of liminal personae ("threshold people") are necessarily ambiguous, since this condition and these persons elude or slip through the network of classifications that normally locate states and positions in cultural space. Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial" (1969, p. 95) . Beyond anthropology the concept of liminality has been taken up in fields such as performance studies (e.g., McKenzie, 2001) , education (e.g., Cook-Sather, 2008; Meyer and Land, 2003, 2005) , political anthropology (e.g., Thomassen, 2009), sociology (e.g., Klein and Williams, 2012) , and occasionally health and social care (Clouder, 2005; Warner and Gabe, 2004) .
In this chapter we seek to explore the utility of "liminality" as a way of making sense of some of the unsettling, in-between, transitional, chaotic, and ambiguous aspects of contemporary suicide prevention theories and practices in relation to young people, aspects often overlooked when suicide is constructed solely from within a dominant biomedical framework (White, 2012) . In order to frame our inquiry we draw in part on Thomassen's (2009) idea that experiences of liminality by particular types of subjects ("single individuals, social groups, or whole societies") can be conceptualized as involving both temporal and spatial aspects; that is, they can "involve moments (sudden events), periods (weeks, months, or possibly years) and epochs
